We won't creep up on net zero; we're going to plow through it like a freight train. We should embrace short-term solutions if they get us to net zero sooner, confident that longer-term solutions will be around the corner.
About holding the peak to 1.5°C,… we have 1.15°C so far, and with the maximum CO2 forcing lagging emissions by 6-10 years, another 0.1+°C is baked into the cake. Other than when there have been significant financial problems(e.g. 2009, 2020-2021), we have had increasing emissions (a new record is expected in 2022 if all goes “well”). It is hard to conceive of how emissions could be significantly lower in the near term in any palatable way. IF 100% of all emissions ceased tomorrow we’d still get the additional forcing from the removal of all the anthropogenic aerosols (e.g. from coal, #6 oil, etc.) - as much as another 0.9°C, for a total comfortably over 2°C.
I’d happily take the other side to any wager on staying below 1.5°C, or even the higher 1.8°C overshoot goal you mentioned.
2. If emissions dropped to zero today, how much additional warming would we see? You mention "0.1+°C". But the page I linked above links in turn to https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/chapter/chapter-1/, and quotes that report as implying a somewhat larger baked-in increase: "...any further warming beyond the 1°C already experienced would likely be less than 0.5°C over the next two to three decades (high confidence), and likely less than 0.5°C on a century time scale (medium confidence)….". This doesn't actually give a number, but suggests that the expected range goes well beyond 0.1+°C. (Admittedly, I have not tried to read the linked report.)
3. Again if emissions dropped to zero today, what would be the trajectory of atmospheric GHG concentrations, in particular for CO2? For instance, the oceans have absorbed a lot of excess CO2; would that carbon work its way back into the atmosphere, slowing the decline of atmospheric CO2 back to pre-industrial levels? I suppose this might be a moot point, since atmospheric CO2 is long-lived and thus we would not expect much decline (unless / until we reach a point of substantial negative net emissions).
4. I haven't seen much discussion of the "removal of all the anthropogenic aerosols" issue. Now that you mention it, I do recall reading something about a cooling effect from aerosols. But I haven't seen anyone talk about a large warming effect waiting to manifest when (hopefully) we stop burning fossil fuels. Do you know of an accessible source I could read to learn more about this?
Re #1: True, pre-industrial should be early 1700s, the time Darby began his smelting operations and of Newcomen’s steam engine. But my sense is there is not enough defensible planetary temperature going back to that time. Data of reasonable quality begins around the same time as Figure 1 in your link (1880). It would be easy to suggest another 0.1°C between 1710 and 1880 though I doubt much more as there just weren’t any significant emissions. A look at UK coal production from the 18th century might be the best for approximating early emissions. When discussing these ideas I like to refer to safe numbers that won’t be used as quibbles to the larger points being made. Rarely does anyone suggest my numbers are Pollyannish!
Re #2: Again, trying to offer safely defensible numbers. The several year time lag comes from https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/9/12/124002/pdf. Refer to Fig. 1, if you go with 10.1 year time lag, and sum up under the curve it is something like 150GtC @ 2.5m°K/GtC for +0.375°C. Much closer to your expectation, and very safe for me to claim 0.1+°C.
Re #3: Yes. As the partial pressure for C02 has increased, the gas has diffused into the water and with a reduction in partial pressure the water will concentrate(is that the correct word??) CO2 back into the atmosphere.
Re #4: This is not understood and agreed upon as much as I’d like, but the trend in estimates is not good. Something on the order of 1-1.2W/m² for anthropogenic aerosols. And it is thought the cooling effect is potentially much greater over water (most analysis has focused on land); the global effect may be much higher than 1-1.2. Again, I chose the milder side of what I assume are more likely but still uncertain values. A reasonable intro: https://www.nature.com/scitable/knowledge/library/aerosols-and-their-relation-to-global-climate-102215345/ Interestingly, much was learned as a result of 9/11 as documented in the BBC video: https://vimeo.com/138779240 For more sciencey stuff, search “global cooling aerosols” and glean from the somniating research papers.
I usually don’t focus too much on all these specific numbers but more the trends and relative sense of the myriad things already happening (e.g. plummeting arctic ice volume, ever-increasing emissions - CO2 (and others), lower albedo, increased natural emissions, etc.). And most warming goals (this still sounds bizarre to me) are placed with odds of occurrence as are the consequences (e.g. “X” has a Y% chance of disappearing in Z years). Image search for “Arctic Death Spiral” and check out the ice volume on that September line. How does that not hit zero? Then the heat that melted ice heats the water instead (heat of fusion for water is 80cal/g - ouch!) and then what powers the polar cell? and the northern Ferrel cell… where most food is grown? And then what?
My earlier comment about the certainty of crossing 1.5, 1.8°C, or more might not be so bad if CO2 removal were enacted pronto. But the required technologies (net-negative CO2) do not currently exist. Powering them with “green” energies - that are completely dependent on fossil fuels for their implementation, will only further add CO2 and other GHGs, some with global warming potential thousands of times greater than CO2 and multi-millennial atmospheric lifespans. Meanwhile, tipping points.
Even if the technological systems with net-negative CO2 became available (unlikely given the dependency on industrial processes), and renewable energies were magically no longer dependent on fossil fuels for their materials, manufacture, installation and maintenance (I’ll ignore end of life issues), it would still take decades (more tipping points) for the fossil fuel to renewable energy transition to happen. And past energy substitutions have always been for energies that provided better service and high ERoI, not less utility with lower ERoI sources like many contemporary renewables. Then, after all of those issues, the carbon would need to be stowed safely in perpetuity.
If I'm reading this correctly, you're basically saying:
1. It's going to be hard to convince the world – or, more properly, the myriad independent actors therein – to transition to clean energy sources.
2. Even if successful, it will take decades, during which substantial additional warming will occur.
3. Some actions, such as energy-intensive approaches to carbon capture, will do more harm than good unless done in careful sequence. (E.g. build out true-green energy before deploying large amounts of carbon capture.)
If that's a fair summary, then: I would agree with all three points. For #1, I am *somewhat* optimistic, based on the amazing decline in the cost of PV, wind, and lithium-ion batteries. (See, for instance, the Oxford paper I linked here. Though my next post, currently being drafted, will be on the topic of long-tail applications of fossil fuels; it's one thing to convert light bulbs in California, and quite another to convert industrial machinery in Iran.)
Regarding #2, I wish I had a better understanding of the scenario modeling that organizations like the IPCC have done. I've found the sources I've consulted so far to be confusing; see my replies to your previous comment.
Re #1: I’m saying it doesn’t matter if the world is convinced or not. Humans, like all of life, partake of the Maximum Power Principle. Not sure who said this (Nate Hagens?), but “Thermodynamics, expressed through genetics, creates beings incapable of not maximizing energy consumption.” Leaving useful oil, coal or whatever in the ground just isn’t going to happen to any significant level. Oh sure, we’re intelligent and clever, but those are just tools to further the cause(MPP), regardless of our obliviousness to that fact.
Re #2: Yes. See Cesare Marcetti’s analysis on “Primary Energy Substitution Models”: http://newmaeweb.ucsd.edu/courses/MAE119/WI_2018/ewExternalFiles/Primary%20Energy%20Substitution%20Model%20-%20Marchetti%201977.pdf Another impediment that Marcetti didn't factor in is the ERoI issue; transitioning to lower ERoI has never happened without a significant degradation in vitality. As Nicole Foss said (I remembered her!), “We are caught in a paradox; the energies of the future have an EROEI too low for them to sustain a society complex enough to produce them.” Which reminds me to direct you to “The Collapse of Complex Societies” by Joseph Tainter on complexity. IMO, trying to understand the interrelations of the 3 E’s (energy, environment and economics) without a grasp of systems complexity will come up short.
Re #3: I think the pursuit of CCS, DCA, or whatever provides false comfort, furthers complacency and will never achieve net-negative emissions.
I saw a great book title (content unrelated to this discussion) called “Solutions and Other Problems” - carbon removal reminds me of that title.
I don’t think the price of PV matters if it is utterly dependent on a system built with higher ERoI energies (see Foss quote above). There are also those pesky very long-lived GHGs associated with PV mfg. CH4 is a lightweight compared to NF3, SF6, CF4, C2F6. Fortunately, at least to date, the ppts (part per trillions) for those are low, but as PV (life span 20-30(?) yrs) and other electronics continue to be manufactured and likely scaled up to some extent, the ppts only go up and stick around for much longer than any civilization ever has. The scale of the minerals required offer varying levels of concern but will require mining and refining of ever-lower grades requiring yet more energy (complexity). It isn’t just CO2 that screws the biosphere, industrial extraction and pollution are significant. Dissipative systems, rah. Gail Tverberg had a nice write up on much of this, with some economics thrown in. She mentions Tainter too: https://ourfiniteworld.com/2016/02/08/the-physics-of-energy-and-the-economy/
This is a bit much for me to respond to point-by-point, but to take a few:
1. Aren't we *already* seeing usage of coal declining in many countries? And if the cost of renewable power declines below the cost of coal, shouldn't we expect coal to vanish? I'm new to this topic, but it's not clear to me why ERoI should be a better yardstick than dollars-per-kWh? ERoI helps us understand some components of total dollar cost, but it is not a complete picture.
"Leaving useful oil, coal or whatever in the ground..." – if a resource is outcompeted on price, then it's not useful.
2. "I don’t think the price of PV matters if it is utterly dependent on a system built with higher ERoI energies": again, I'm struggling to understand why ERoI is a useful concept. If I can get $2 of power from $1 of PV, or wind turbines, or whatever, then... I'm happy?
3. Regarding CCS / DCA – did you mean DAC (Direct Air Capture)? Sure there are moral hazards here, but these technologies still strike me as important, DAC in particular. There are bad paths without DAC, and bad paths with DAC, but I think the only good paths involve DAC. We need to develop this technology *and* we need to not use it as an excuse for insufficient action elsewhere. That won't be easy but I don't know what the alternative is.
That indicates a demand that, at least in the near term, doesn't have much flexibility. I assume this price is likely to have a rapid drop, and probably soon, but for coal companies that is a good indicator sign for future viability.
2. You do agree that ERoEI of 1 is pointless, that any energy production system that only provides enough energy for it's own construction, operation, etc and provides no excess for society is pointless (to society)? And <1 is only a drain on society? And, ceteris paribus, much higher is better than a little higher?
As alluded to in coal reply, solar (and wind) have problem of their standalone ERoI is notably higher than their systemic ERoI because of their intermittency; they require massive storage and/or supporting baseline generation. PV might have a standalone ERoI of 8 say, but to be useful on a grid it might require other components, with their associated energy costs, yielding a notably lower system ERoI. Lower ERoI is less utile to society.
Another hugely overlooked problem with lower ERoI energy sources is how fast can they be expanded without being cannibalistic? If we grant PV an ERoI of 7.5 and a life-time of 30 years (just tossing figures here), that leads to a maximum doubling time of 4 years (19% annual) in order to not be cannibalising energy during build up. That also means while doubling every 4 years there is no benefit derived from the PV - it only provides enough energy to continue the growth. That also assumes system needs no additional capital (energy) and the ERoI is not lower. Other rough edges in this overly simplified scenario is that not all the energy for PV is required upfront of course, and that electricity is as useful as fossil fuels in mining, refining, manufacturing, installation and maintenance of new PV as fossil fuels. (electricity is generally considered a higher quality energy than fossil fuel but the quality is variable depending on application - industrial mining, refining and transportation are particularly challenging on anything close to current scale of these operations).
3. Yes DAC. The alternative is for humankind to stop doing stuff, instead of relying upon new technologies that are yet unproven and with further unintended consequences. If pursuing DAC, how do you store all that carbon safely in perpetuity? Who pays for that, not just the money, but the energy? Run a few numbers on the scale of resources required to build and operate the DAC on a meaningful level and you'll see what I mean by unintended consequences. How much stuff is it ok to mine from the earth? How much stuff can we mine without harming indigenous people? How much stuff can we get without conflict with foreign powers? How much is enough?
I believe I understand the things you're saying about ERoI, but I'm not sure how this ties back to the original discussion. In order to pull back from the details, I'll ask again, "If I can get $2 of power from $1 of PV, or wind turbines, or whatever, then... I'm happy?" If the ERoI analysis somehow shows that these technologies are not a valid solution, shouldn't that somehow be showing up in market pricing and rendering PV and wind uncompetitive? I have some specific thoughts as to why the ERoI argument may be invalid, but rather than get caught up in details, for now I'll just ask why it's not showing up in the total system cost.
Sure, as these intermittent sources become a larger portion of the grid, we are going to have to add storage and other complementary solutions in order to maintain reliable power 24x7, and that will add cost. My understanding/hope is that the various learning curves put us on a path to achieve this, as well, at a competitive cost.
Yes, solar and wind can be purchased at less per watt than coal (and oil and even NG as prices continue to rise). If you can deal with the intermittency then that would be a prudent investment. But without storage or a grid connection to provide a cushion for those times when more or less power is needed, they are not particularly useful for most end users.
Storage system costs are not insignificant, hence most people tie to the grid. The externalized costs of using the grid go to the utilities and other customers. The associated energy costs lowers the systemic ERoI of PV or wind. The grid, utility and other customers can absorb some level of intermittency on the system with limited degradation and increased costs but, as you noted, there comes a point when that that becomes too large a share and other investments will be needed.
In an ideal world the ERoI for an energy system would be directly correlated to the price of the system. Unfortunately, policies, regulations, incentives, externalizations, cost of money, (…ad nauseum) obscure this connection. Many years ago a utility-scale biomass plant was planned in our area. By the numbers the investors would make money if they could build it. I performed an ERoI analysis that showed the plant would not offer enough of an energy profit to be useful to our regional power system to justify being built. Nobody cared. It was only when I offered a cumulative net CO2 emissions report that it was finally nixed. Point being, sensible energy projects and sensible investments don't necessarily overlap.
I'd be interested in your thoughts as to why ERoI is somehow invalid. Until then, I'd ask you to consider some general ERoI ideas and analysis by Hall, Balogh and Murphy https://www.mdpi.com/1996-1073/2/1/25/pdf . (dislaimer: I worked with Hall and Murphy on the ERoI of Middle East, US GoM and Athabasca tar sand oils in early 2010s.)
A slight digression, but if a "clean" energy source is noticeably better than some "dirty" energy source why does the dirtier energy, which is far from scarce, carry a premium price? Why all the demand? And it is alarming to realize that at higher prices for the dirty fuel it becomes profitable to exploit additional lower-grade (higher associated emissions, lower ERoI, etc.) reserves. Only when oil, coal and NG prices suffer interminable losses will you know that the remaining energy sources can stand on their own merits.
An example of "useful coal" being left in the ground – this popped up on my Twitter feed yesterday, in Australia, not known for its coal-unfriendly policies: "Australia's biggest coal plant is shutting down ahead of schedule because, according to its owner, coal power simply cannot compete with renewables." (from https://www.ft.com/content/e6b4e530-a6ec-4a3f-b9ab-8dbfa5d65306)
The FT link is behind paywall but I believe I found similar article about Origin Energy(?). Article speaks of closure in 2025, seven years early than scheduled. CE Frank Calabria lamented that "… coal-fired plants, all struggling with sliding power prices which have hurt plants that don't have the flexibility toswitch off when there is surplus energy."
I'd be more interested an electric grid manager's take than the CE who might be trying to exert pressure on national regulators with his words (threat?) This is an electric grid managers nightmare. Solar, coal, hydro, nuke, etc. are all pieces of the most complex systems man has ever created; electric power grids. Without massive batteries, pumped-hydro or the like, some baseline will be required to have a "useful" electric system.
While expedient, "useful" is a rather loaded word. Doesn't mean profitable, practical, nor cogent.
Can you explain that "Nature Removal" green line on your "GHG Emissions" graph? I know it is all conceptual, but what is it meant to represent exactly? As portrayed it looks to be pretty robust factor over the next few decades.
> Can you explain that "Nature Removal" green line on your "GHG Emissions" graph?
I should have found a better term, but this is meant to represent natural processes which remove GHGs from the atmosphere, such as absorption of CO2 by the ocean. My assumption was that this would scale loosely with net emissions, but with a slight lag.
So the emission values for Natural Removal should be inverted about the x-axis then? That is, negative to about 2055 and then turning positive as atmospheric partial pressure presumably falls to a low enough value that the oceans then concentrate CO2 back to the air?
Are you intending to include emissive natural processes resulting from higher temps (e.g. permafrost, subsea, wildfires) or only those that are absorbtive?
Quite the conundrum,… acidifying the oceans is a component of atmospheric remediation.
Well, prior to ~2055, I'm (handwavily) representing "Natural Removal" as a *positive* amount of carbon removed from the atmosphere. One could also represent it as a *negative* contribution to atmospheric CO2, in which case, yes, it would need to be inverted about the x-axis.
"Capture" is treated in the same fashion as "Natural Removal", i.e. positive values indicate positive amounts of carbon removed from the atmosphere. Perhaps it would have been less confusing if I had flipped them upside down.
> Are you intending to include emissive natural processes resulting from higher temps (e.g. permafrost, subsea, wildfires) or only those that are absorbtive?
I didn't have data for that, and it wasn't directly relevant to the point I was trying to make in this particular post, which is simply that *if* we succeed in reaching net zero, I think it is inevitable that we will then progress to net negative emissions.
I would very much like to better understand the issues you're getting at, and I wish there was a clear, succinct guide that covered the entire big picture, but if that's out there I haven't found it yet. I'm seriously considering trying to create it myself, but this would require substantially more research and rigor than I've had time to invest so far.
About holding the peak to 1.5°C,… we have 1.15°C so far, and with the maximum CO2 forcing lagging emissions by 6-10 years, another 0.1+°C is baked into the cake. Other than when there have been significant financial problems(e.g. 2009, 2020-2021), we have had increasing emissions (a new record is expected in 2022 if all goes “well”). It is hard to conceive of how emissions could be significantly lower in the near term in any palatable way. IF 100% of all emissions ceased tomorrow we’d still get the additional forcing from the removal of all the anthropogenic aerosols (e.g. from coal, #6 oil, etc.) - as much as another 0.9°C, for a total comfortably over 2°C.
I’d happily take the other side to any wager on staying below 1.5°C, or even the higher 1.8°C overshoot goal you mentioned.
Thanks for chiming in! You're touching on points that I am, frankly, extremely confused about:
1. Compared to pre-industrial times, how much warming has already occurred? You mention 1.15°C, which is mostly the number I see reported. But the graph at the top of https://www.climate.gov/news-features/climate-qa/if-carbon-dioxide-hits-new-high-every-year-why-isn%E2%80%99t-every-year-hotter-last shows the planet as currently about 1.15°C warmer than the 20th century average, which implies a significantly larger delta vs. pre-industrial times.
2. If emissions dropped to zero today, how much additional warming would we see? You mention "0.1+°C". But the page I linked above links in turn to https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/chapter/chapter-1/, and quotes that report as implying a somewhat larger baked-in increase: "...any further warming beyond the 1°C already experienced would likely be less than 0.5°C over the next two to three decades (high confidence), and likely less than 0.5°C on a century time scale (medium confidence)….". This doesn't actually give a number, but suggests that the expected range goes well beyond 0.1+°C. (Admittedly, I have not tried to read the linked report.)
3. Again if emissions dropped to zero today, what would be the trajectory of atmospheric GHG concentrations, in particular for CO2? For instance, the oceans have absorbed a lot of excess CO2; would that carbon work its way back into the atmosphere, slowing the decline of atmospheric CO2 back to pre-industrial levels? I suppose this might be a moot point, since atmospheric CO2 is long-lived and thus we would not expect much decline (unless / until we reach a point of substantial negative net emissions).
4. I haven't seen much discussion of the "removal of all the anthropogenic aerosols" issue. Now that you mention it, I do recall reading something about a cooling effect from aerosols. But I haven't seen anyone talk about a large warming effect waiting to manifest when (hopefully) we stop burning fossil fuels. Do you know of an accessible source I could read to learn more about this?
Re #1: True, pre-industrial should be early 1700s, the time Darby began his smelting operations and of Newcomen’s steam engine. But my sense is there is not enough defensible planetary temperature going back to that time. Data of reasonable quality begins around the same time as Figure 1 in your link (1880). It would be easy to suggest another 0.1°C between 1710 and 1880 though I doubt much more as there just weren’t any significant emissions. A look at UK coal production from the 18th century might be the best for approximating early emissions. When discussing these ideas I like to refer to safe numbers that won’t be used as quibbles to the larger points being made. Rarely does anyone suggest my numbers are Pollyannish!
Re #2: Again, trying to offer safely defensible numbers. The several year time lag comes from https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/9/12/124002/pdf. Refer to Fig. 1, if you go with 10.1 year time lag, and sum up under the curve it is something like 150GtC @ 2.5m°K/GtC for +0.375°C. Much closer to your expectation, and very safe for me to claim 0.1+°C.
Re #3: Yes. As the partial pressure for C02 has increased, the gas has diffused into the water and with a reduction in partial pressure the water will concentrate(is that the correct word??) CO2 back into the atmosphere.
Re #4: This is not understood and agreed upon as much as I’d like, but the trend in estimates is not good. Something on the order of 1-1.2W/m² for anthropogenic aerosols. And it is thought the cooling effect is potentially much greater over water (most analysis has focused on land); the global effect may be much higher than 1-1.2. Again, I chose the milder side of what I assume are more likely but still uncertain values. A reasonable intro: https://www.nature.com/scitable/knowledge/library/aerosols-and-their-relation-to-global-climate-102215345/ Interestingly, much was learned as a result of 9/11 as documented in the BBC video: https://vimeo.com/138779240 For more sciencey stuff, search “global cooling aerosols” and glean from the somniating research papers.
I usually don’t focus too much on all these specific numbers but more the trends and relative sense of the myriad things already happening (e.g. plummeting arctic ice volume, ever-increasing emissions - CO2 (and others), lower albedo, increased natural emissions, etc.). And most warming goals (this still sounds bizarre to me) are placed with odds of occurrence as are the consequences (e.g. “X” has a Y% chance of disappearing in Z years). Image search for “Arctic Death Spiral” and check out the ice volume on that September line. How does that not hit zero? Then the heat that melted ice heats the water instead (heat of fusion for water is 80cal/g - ouch!) and then what powers the polar cell? and the northern Ferrel cell… where most food is grown? And then what?
My earlier comment about the certainty of crossing 1.5, 1.8°C, or more might not be so bad if CO2 removal were enacted pronto. But the required technologies (net-negative CO2) do not currently exist. Powering them with “green” energies - that are completely dependent on fossil fuels for their implementation, will only further add CO2 and other GHGs, some with global warming potential thousands of times greater than CO2 and multi-millennial atmospheric lifespans. Meanwhile, tipping points.
Even if the technological systems with net-negative CO2 became available (unlikely given the dependency on industrial processes), and renewable energies were magically no longer dependent on fossil fuels for their materials, manufacture, installation and maintenance (I’ll ignore end of life issues), it would still take decades (more tipping points) for the fossil fuel to renewable energy transition to happen. And past energy substitutions have always been for energies that provided better service and high ERoI, not less utility with lower ERoI sources like many contemporary renewables. Then, after all of those issues, the carbon would need to be stowed safely in perpetuity.
If I'm reading this correctly, you're basically saying:
1. It's going to be hard to convince the world – or, more properly, the myriad independent actors therein – to transition to clean energy sources.
2. Even if successful, it will take decades, during which substantial additional warming will occur.
3. Some actions, such as energy-intensive approaches to carbon capture, will do more harm than good unless done in careful sequence. (E.g. build out true-green energy before deploying large amounts of carbon capture.)
If that's a fair summary, then: I would agree with all three points. For #1, I am *somewhat* optimistic, based on the amazing decline in the cost of PV, wind, and lithium-ion batteries. (See, for instance, the Oxford paper I linked here. Though my next post, currently being drafted, will be on the topic of long-tail applications of fossil fuels; it's one thing to convert light bulbs in California, and quite another to convert industrial machinery in Iran.)
Regarding #2, I wish I had a better understanding of the scenario modeling that organizations like the IPCC have done. I've found the sources I've consulted so far to be confusing; see my replies to your previous comment.
Re #1: I’m saying it doesn’t matter if the world is convinced or not. Humans, like all of life, partake of the Maximum Power Principle. Not sure who said this (Nate Hagens?), but “Thermodynamics, expressed through genetics, creates beings incapable of not maximizing energy consumption.” Leaving useful oil, coal or whatever in the ground just isn’t going to happen to any significant level. Oh sure, we’re intelligent and clever, but those are just tools to further the cause(MPP), regardless of our obliviousness to that fact.
Re #2: Yes. See Cesare Marcetti’s analysis on “Primary Energy Substitution Models”: http://newmaeweb.ucsd.edu/courses/MAE119/WI_2018/ewExternalFiles/Primary%20Energy%20Substitution%20Model%20-%20Marchetti%201977.pdf Another impediment that Marcetti didn't factor in is the ERoI issue; transitioning to lower ERoI has never happened without a significant degradation in vitality. As Nicole Foss said (I remembered her!), “We are caught in a paradox; the energies of the future have an EROEI too low for them to sustain a society complex enough to produce them.” Which reminds me to direct you to “The Collapse of Complex Societies” by Joseph Tainter on complexity. IMO, trying to understand the interrelations of the 3 E’s (energy, environment and economics) without a grasp of systems complexity will come up short.
Re #3: I think the pursuit of CCS, DCA, or whatever provides false comfort, furthers complacency and will never achieve net-negative emissions.
I saw a great book title (content unrelated to this discussion) called “Solutions and Other Problems” - carbon removal reminds me of that title.
I don’t think the price of PV matters if it is utterly dependent on a system built with higher ERoI energies (see Foss quote above). There are also those pesky very long-lived GHGs associated with PV mfg. CH4 is a lightweight compared to NF3, SF6, CF4, C2F6. Fortunately, at least to date, the ppts (part per trillions) for those are low, but as PV (life span 20-30(?) yrs) and other electronics continue to be manufactured and likely scaled up to some extent, the ppts only go up and stick around for much longer than any civilization ever has. The scale of the minerals required offer varying levels of concern but will require mining and refining of ever-lower grades requiring yet more energy (complexity). It isn’t just CO2 that screws the biosphere, industrial extraction and pollution are significant. Dissipative systems, rah. Gail Tverberg had a nice write up on much of this, with some economics thrown in. She mentions Tainter too: https://ourfiniteworld.com/2016/02/08/the-physics-of-energy-and-the-economy/
This is a bit much for me to respond to point-by-point, but to take a few:
1. Aren't we *already* seeing usage of coal declining in many countries? And if the cost of renewable power declines below the cost of coal, shouldn't we expect coal to vanish? I'm new to this topic, but it's not clear to me why ERoI should be a better yardstick than dollars-per-kWh? ERoI helps us understand some components of total dollar cost, but it is not a complete picture.
"Leaving useful oil, coal or whatever in the ground..." – if a resource is outcompeted on price, then it's not useful.
2. "I don’t think the price of PV matters if it is utterly dependent on a system built with higher ERoI energies": again, I'm struggling to understand why ERoI is a useful concept. If I can get $2 of power from $1 of PV, or wind turbines, or whatever, then... I'm happy?
3. Regarding CCS / DCA – did you mean DAC (Direct Air Capture)? Sure there are moral hazards here, but these technologies still strike me as important, DAC in particular. There are bad paths without DAC, and bad paths with DAC, but I think the only good paths involve DAC. We need to develop this technology *and* we need to not use it as an excuse for insufficient action elsewhere. That won't be easy but I don't know what the alternative is.
1. Yes. and increasing in some countries too. See IEA Coal: https://www.iea.org/reports/coal-2021/executive-summary
"Based on current trends, global coal demand is set to rise to 8 025 Mt in 2022, the highest level ever seen, and to remain there through 2024."
And take a look at Newcastle coal prices: https://pbs.twimg.com/media/FM49_S1XEAwRrIn?format=jpg&name=small
That indicates a demand that, at least in the near term, doesn't have much flexibility. I assume this price is likely to have a rapid drop, and probably soon, but for coal companies that is a good indicator sign for future viability.
2. You do agree that ERoEI of 1 is pointless, that any energy production system that only provides enough energy for it's own construction, operation, etc and provides no excess for society is pointless (to society)? And <1 is only a drain on society? And, ceteris paribus, much higher is better than a little higher?
As alluded to in coal reply, solar (and wind) have problem of their standalone ERoI is notably higher than their systemic ERoI because of their intermittency; they require massive storage and/or supporting baseline generation. PV might have a standalone ERoI of 8 say, but to be useful on a grid it might require other components, with their associated energy costs, yielding a notably lower system ERoI. Lower ERoI is less utile to society.
Another hugely overlooked problem with lower ERoI energy sources is how fast can they be expanded without being cannibalistic? If we grant PV an ERoI of 7.5 and a life-time of 30 years (just tossing figures here), that leads to a maximum doubling time of 4 years (19% annual) in order to not be cannibalising energy during build up. That also means while doubling every 4 years there is no benefit derived from the PV - it only provides enough energy to continue the growth. That also assumes system needs no additional capital (energy) and the ERoI is not lower. Other rough edges in this overly simplified scenario is that not all the energy for PV is required upfront of course, and that electricity is as useful as fossil fuels in mining, refining, manufacturing, installation and maintenance of new PV as fossil fuels. (electricity is generally considered a higher quality energy than fossil fuel but the quality is variable depending on application - industrial mining, refining and transportation are particularly challenging on anything close to current scale of these operations).
3. Yes DAC. The alternative is for humankind to stop doing stuff, instead of relying upon new technologies that are yet unproven and with further unintended consequences. If pursuing DAC, how do you store all that carbon safely in perpetuity? Who pays for that, not just the money, but the energy? Run a few numbers on the scale of resources required to build and operate the DAC on a meaningful level and you'll see what I mean by unintended consequences. How much stuff is it ok to mine from the earth? How much stuff can we mine without harming indigenous people? How much stuff can we get without conflict with foreign powers? How much is enough?
I believe I understand the things you're saying about ERoI, but I'm not sure how this ties back to the original discussion. In order to pull back from the details, I'll ask again, "If I can get $2 of power from $1 of PV, or wind turbines, or whatever, then... I'm happy?" If the ERoI analysis somehow shows that these technologies are not a valid solution, shouldn't that somehow be showing up in market pricing and rendering PV and wind uncompetitive? I have some specific thoughts as to why the ERoI argument may be invalid, but rather than get caught up in details, for now I'll just ask why it's not showing up in the total system cost.
Sure, as these intermittent sources become a larger portion of the grid, we are going to have to add storage and other complementary solutions in order to maintain reliable power 24x7, and that will add cost. My understanding/hope is that the various learning curves put us on a path to achieve this, as well, at a competitive cost.
Yes, solar and wind can be purchased at less per watt than coal (and oil and even NG as prices continue to rise). If you can deal with the intermittency then that would be a prudent investment. But without storage or a grid connection to provide a cushion for those times when more or less power is needed, they are not particularly useful for most end users.
Storage system costs are not insignificant, hence most people tie to the grid. The externalized costs of using the grid go to the utilities and other customers. The associated energy costs lowers the systemic ERoI of PV or wind. The grid, utility and other customers can absorb some level of intermittency on the system with limited degradation and increased costs but, as you noted, there comes a point when that that becomes too large a share and other investments will be needed.
In an ideal world the ERoI for an energy system would be directly correlated to the price of the system. Unfortunately, policies, regulations, incentives, externalizations, cost of money, (…ad nauseum) obscure this connection. Many years ago a utility-scale biomass plant was planned in our area. By the numbers the investors would make money if they could build it. I performed an ERoI analysis that showed the plant would not offer enough of an energy profit to be useful to our regional power system to justify being built. Nobody cared. It was only when I offered a cumulative net CO2 emissions report that it was finally nixed. Point being, sensible energy projects and sensible investments don't necessarily overlap.
I'd be interested in your thoughts as to why ERoI is somehow invalid. Until then, I'd ask you to consider some general ERoI ideas and analysis by Hall, Balogh and Murphy https://www.mdpi.com/1996-1073/2/1/25/pdf . (dislaimer: I worked with Hall and Murphy on the ERoI of Middle East, US GoM and Athabasca tar sand oils in early 2010s.)
A slight digression, but if a "clean" energy source is noticeably better than some "dirty" energy source why does the dirtier energy, which is far from scarce, carry a premium price? Why all the demand? And it is alarming to realize that at higher prices for the dirty fuel it becomes profitable to exploit additional lower-grade (higher associated emissions, lower ERoI, etc.) reserves. Only when oil, coal and NG prices suffer interminable losses will you know that the remaining energy sources can stand on their own merits.
An example of "useful coal" being left in the ground – this popped up on my Twitter feed yesterday, in Australia, not known for its coal-unfriendly policies: "Australia's biggest coal plant is shutting down ahead of schedule because, according to its owner, coal power simply cannot compete with renewables." (from https://www.ft.com/content/e6b4e530-a6ec-4a3f-b9ab-8dbfa5d65306)
The FT link is behind paywall but I believe I found similar article about Origin Energy(?). Article speaks of closure in 2025, seven years early than scheduled. CE Frank Calabria lamented that "… coal-fired plants, all struggling with sliding power prices which have hurt plants that don't have the flexibility toswitch off when there is surplus energy."
I'd be more interested an electric grid manager's take than the CE who might be trying to exert pressure on national regulators with his words (threat?) This is an electric grid managers nightmare. Solar, coal, hydro, nuke, etc. are all pieces of the most complex systems man has ever created; electric power grids. Without massive batteries, pumped-hydro or the like, some baseline will be required to have a "useful" electric system.
While expedient, "useful" is a rather loaded word. Doesn't mean profitable, practical, nor cogent.
Can you explain that "Nature Removal" green line on your "GHG Emissions" graph? I know it is all conceptual, but what is it meant to represent exactly? As portrayed it looks to be pretty robust factor over the next few decades.
> Can you explain that "Nature Removal" green line on your "GHG Emissions" graph?
I should have found a better term, but this is meant to represent natural processes which remove GHGs from the atmosphere, such as absorption of CO2 by the ocean. My assumption was that this would scale loosely with net emissions, but with a slight lag.
So the emission values for Natural Removal should be inverted about the x-axis then? That is, negative to about 2055 and then turning positive as atmospheric partial pressure presumably falls to a low enough value that the oceans then concentrate CO2 back to the air?
Are you intending to include emissive natural processes resulting from higher temps (e.g. permafrost, subsea, wildfires) or only those that are absorbtive?
Quite the conundrum,… acidifying the oceans is a component of atmospheric remediation.
Well, prior to ~2055, I'm (handwavily) representing "Natural Removal" as a *positive* amount of carbon removed from the atmosphere. One could also represent it as a *negative* contribution to atmospheric CO2, in which case, yes, it would need to be inverted about the x-axis.
"Capture" is treated in the same fashion as "Natural Removal", i.e. positive values indicate positive amounts of carbon removed from the atmosphere. Perhaps it would have been less confusing if I had flipped them upside down.
> Are you intending to include emissive natural processes resulting from higher temps (e.g. permafrost, subsea, wildfires) or only those that are absorbtive?
I didn't have data for that, and it wasn't directly relevant to the point I was trying to make in this particular post, which is simply that *if* we succeed in reaching net zero, I think it is inevitable that we will then progress to net negative emissions.
I would very much like to better understand the issues you're getting at, and I wish there was a clear, succinct guide that covered the entire big picture, but if that's out there I haven't found it yet. I'm seriously considering trying to create it myself, but this would require substantially more research and rigor than I've had time to invest so far.
Ha! Cliffs Notes for Complex Systems.